We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mechanism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type.
(1993) developed a procedure to regulate a monopolist with unknown cost in the absence of any fund constraints. The main property of the optimal (or second best) mechanism is full separability of types, that is, if the monopolist is a high (low) cost type then she produces lower (higher) quantity and recieve a lower (higher) transfer. The cost of separation, induced by the optimal mechanism, is the information rent enjoyed by the lower cost or more efficient types. The regulator uses its fund to pay this information rent. However, if there are numerous projects, public funds are usually scarce. It is reasonable to imagine that the fund provider may be unable to finance the monopolist at the level prescribed by the optimal mechanism.
When funds are limited, the regulator has two instruments to limit the transfer: (a) bunching the more efficient types and (b) under-production. The optimal regulatory mechanism, which we call the constrained optimal mechanism, prescribes that the monopolist supplies a good of lower quantity (compared to the second best quantity) and that the more efficient types produce the same quantity. These two distortions reduce the information rent and the quantity produced by the more efficient types. However, if the fund crisis is "too" strong, the constrained optimal mechanism prescribes full bunching. We also highlight the difference between the optimal and the constrained optimal mechanism. Our comparative static result show that a reduction in available fund reduces the quantities produced by all types and increases the interval in which there is bunching.
There are several papers dealing with mechanism design problems under asymmetric information when there exists budget constraints. Laffont and Robert (1996) describe the optimal auction when all the bidders have a financial constraint which is common knowledge. Like in our constrained optimal mechanism, the financial constraint in Laffont and Roberts (1996) reduces the bids of all participants (even those with a low valuation for the good). Che and Gale (2000) extends the result in Laffont and Roberts (1996) by relaxing the assumption that financial constraints are common knowledge. Monteiro and Page Jr. (1998) describe the optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists in the presence of budget constrained buyers. To construct the constrained optimal mechanism, we extend the methodology of Thomas (2002) . Thomas (2002) considers the incentive problem of a monopolist who faces financially constrained buyers. Finally, Gautier (2002) considers the regulator's mechanism design problem under financial constraint when there are two types of firm. In Gautier (2002) , bunching is an issue only if the financial constraint is sufficiently strong. We develop and analyze our model in Sections 2-4. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
The model
The utility of the monopolist is U m = t−θq where t is the transfer that she receives from the regulator and θ is her marginal cost and q is the quantity of the public good she produces. The utility function of the regulator is U r = S(q) − t where S(q) is the consumer's surplus when a quantity q of public good is supplied and t is the transfer to the monopolist. S(q) is assumed to be twice differentiable with S (q) > 0, S (q) < 0 and S (0) = ∞. The regulator's main objective is to select the quantity q to maximize U r . Since S (0) = ∞, the good is always produced. If the regulator knows the marginal cost θ of the monopolist, then the optimal quantity is q f (θ) = S −1 (θ) and the optimal transfer to the monopolist is t(θ) = θq f (θ). The pair q f (θ), t f (θ) is the first best outcome.
1
We assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist is private information. In this context, we assume that the marginal cost of the monopolist θ belongs to the interval [θ, θ] where 0 < θ < θ. This interval is assumed to be common knowledge. It is also common knowledge that (i) the marginal cost has a differentiable density f (θ) and that (ii) f (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] . The regulator's objective is to maxi- 
It is well known in the literature that the optimal mechanism M satisfies both the incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint if and only if the utility of any
q(τ )dτ and the optimal type-contingent quantity q(θ) is non-increasing in θ (see Baron and Myerson, 1982) . Before stating our first Proposition, we provide two relevant definitions.
f (θ) be the hazard rate function where F (.) is the distribution function associated with the density function f (.).
be the virtual type function.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal mechanism is
We omit the proof of Proposition 2.1 since it is quite well known in the literature (see Baron and Myerson, 1982) . It is important to observe that for the benchmark model it is necessary that q b (θ) is non-increasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ] . Non-increasingness of quantity is satisfied if and only if the virtual type z(θ) is non-decreasing in
Thus, for all but the lowest cost firm, we have underproduction under the optimal mechanism compared to the first best outcome. For our main problem, to be analyzed in the next section, we take the following assumption which is stronger than non-decreasingness of the virtual type function z(.).
. This follows from the the second part of Assumption 1 since for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], θ > 0 and L(θ) ≥ 0. It is quite easy to verify that Uniform Distribution satisfy assumption 1. For all density functions with the property that f (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ), assumption 1 is satisfied provided θf (θ) > 1. Therefore, under certain restrictions, Exponential Distribution, Beta Distributions, Gamma Distributions, Pareto Distribution and Weibull Distributions satisfy Assumption 1. Among the class of distributions with the property that there exists a non-empty interval (a, b)
and standard deviation σ satisfies Assumption 1 if and only if 
The constrained optimal mechanism
Complete separation of types is feasible ifT ≥ t b (θ) whereT is the fund available to the regulator and t b (θ) is the transfer of the lowest type under the optimal mechanism. This is because the transfer under the optimal mechanism is strictly decreasing, 
, then (a) the optimal type contingent quantities are
where
the optimal type contingent transfers are
Remark 3.1. Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that for any given cut-off point
is necessary for the optimal output q * (θ) to be non-increasing in
Moreover, assumption 1 also guarantees that Ψ (θ) is well defined and non-decreasing in θ ∈ [θ, θ] . The second part of assumption 1, is sufficient for the monotonicity of
f (θ) since it implies and is implied by non-decreasingness
, then the analysis can be modifiedà la Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) .
From Theorem 3.1 it is obvious that the optimal quantityT θ for the full bunching case (that is forT ≤ T) is strictly lower than any q * (θ) for the partial bunching case (that is forT > T). Moreover, from Theorem 3.1 it also follows that if the fund limit is not binding, that is ifT
, then the following two Propositions summarize a comparative study between the constrained optimal mechanism M * and the optimal mechanism M b .
Theorem 3.1 and its two complementary Propositions (3.2 and 3.3) describe the constrained optimal mechanism and compare it with the optimal mechanism. While full separability of types is the main property of the optimal mechanism M b , this property does not hold in the constrained optimal mechanism M * , at least for the lower cost firms. Hence, with limited fund, the optimal quantity under the constrained optimal mechanism is strictly lower than that of the optimal mechanism (see Proposition 3.2). In the constrained optimal mechanism, there is a conflict between the necessity of separability (the IC constraints) and the fund constraint. Separability of types implies increasing information rents for the lower cost firms. With limited funds, it becomes impossible to finance the information rents of the
more efficient firms. Hence, there is bunching for the lower cost firms. However, the regulator optimally limits the bunching zone (see Proposition 3.3). For that, the contract offered to the higher cost firms (that is firms for which the fund limit is non-binding) is distorted compared to the optimal mechanism M b . Reducing the quantities of the less efficient firms (compared to the optimal mechanism M b ), reduces the information rent, and hence, it is possible to finance separability for a larger fringe of firms. Without any distortions in quantity, the bunching zone would have been [θ,θ] , while by imposing optimal distortions in quantity, the bunching zone is reduced to [θ,θ] . This is shown in Figure 1 . The constrained optimal mechanism, described in the Theorem 3.1, takes care of the trade off between the cost of abandoning separability for the more efficient firms and the cost of larger distortions to preserve it. However, the cost of keeping separability for high cost firm may be too high. In that case we have a full bunching solution.
Remark 3.2. In Baron and Myerson (1982) , the decision to provide the public good is itself a regulatory instrument. In their optimal mechanism, the public good is provided whenever the associated surplus is larger than the cost and this decision does not interfere with the optimal mechanism. Likewise, if, in our problem, S (0) is finite, then exclusion of the higher cost firms from the mechanism is another instrument that can be used to tackle the problem of limited funds. In our problem, the decision of whether to provide the public good or not can be incorporated expost, together with the cut-off point. Given S (0) < ∞, let θ * * denote the highest type for which q * (θ * * ) > 0. Then θ * * andθ are determined by the following conditions:
It is obvious that θ * * is lower than its corresponding value in the optimal mechanism M b . Hence, the presence of limited funds also reduces the probability F (θ * * ) that the public good is provided. Thus, if S (0) is finite, then it is possible that the provision of public good is delayed due to fund crisis.
We conclude our analysis on constrained optimal mechanism with a comparative static result. Consider any two fund limitsT 1 andT 2 such thatT 1 <T 2 ≤ t b (θ). With slight abuse of notation, let q * i (θ) be the type contingent output andθ i be the cut-off point, both associated with the fund limitsT i for i = 1, 2.
A reduction in available funds reduces the optimal quantities and the cut-off point (provided T ≤T 1 ). This comparative static result is intuitive. Due to the scarcity of resources, the opportunity cost of paying information rents to the more efficient firms increases and hence the regulator prefers to save on these rents to finance the infrastructure with its available resources. This result also explains why for a sufficiently small fundT (< T), the constrained optimal mechanism prescribes full bunching.
Welfare implications
The constrained optimal mechanism leads to welfare loss. The welfare is reduced because each type produces a lower quantity of the public good and hence the consumer surplus is lower. Moreover, the welfare is also reduced because there is bunching for the more efficient firms. To satisfy the wealth constraint, the regulator gives up separability for the more efficient firms. From our comparative static result it is obvious that welfare loss is decreasing in available resources (T ).
Finally, what happens when the regulator, instead of maximizing only the expected gains to the consumers, maximizes a weighted sum of the expected gains to the consumers and the expected utility of the monopolist? To see what happens then, let α ∈ [0, 1] be the welfare weight attached to the expected utility of the monoplolist. Observe that α = 0 corresponds to the case we have analyzed so far. If α ∈ (0, 1], the regulators objective is to maximize
Here the optimal (or second best) mechanism specifies q
With limited funds, the constrained optimal mechanism is such that in the separating zone the optimal quantity is q *
)} and E(θ | θ ≤θ) is the conditional expectation of θ given that θ ≤θ. Thus, with welfare weight, the results are qualitatively similar to the results obtained so far as long as the distribution function F (.) is such that q * α (θ) is non-increasing in θ.
Summary
The results and observations of Sections 2 and 3 are the following:
1. The constrained optimal mechanism satisfies four properties (a) bunching of the low cost types (b) separation of the high cost types (c) full bunching if the available fund is small enough and (d) lower output compared to the optimal mechanism for all types. 2. The constrained optimal mechanism adds distortion in order to optimally reduce the bunching zone of the low cost (or more efficient) types. This is achieved by reducing the optimal quantity of the high cost types in comparison to the optimal mechanism. 3. In our problem we have assumed that S (0) = ∞. If instead S (0) is finite, then exclusion of the higher cost firms from the mechanism is another instrument that can be used to tackle the problem of limited funds. In that case we have the possibility that the provision of public good is delayed due to fund crisis. 4. If the available fund is not "too" small, then a reduction in fund reduces the optimal quantity for all types and it reduces the cut-off point. 5. The constrained optimal mechanism leads to welfare loss because, relative to the optimal mechanism, each type produces a lower quantity of the public good that leads to a lower consumer surplus. 6. If the regulator adds non-zero welfare weight to the monopolist's utility, then the results are qualitatively similar to the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 provided the distribution function is such that the optimal type contingent quantity is non-increasing.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For a continuous mechanism, IC implies that truth-telling is a best response of the monopolist, that is { ∂Um(θ;θ ) ∂θ } θ =θ = 0 almost everywhere. This condition implies that t (θ) = θq (θ) almost everywhere. From IC we also know that q(θ) must be non-increasing in θ and hence t(θ) must be non-increasing in θ.
2 For the optimization problem [P * ], letθ be the first type for which the fund limit is not binding. Therefore, for all θ ∈ [θ,θ), the fund limit is binding and for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] it is not binding (or free). (θ, θ) . From IC and PC we also know that U m (θ) = −q(θ) < 0 almost everywhere and optimality of the mechanism guarantees that U m (θ) = 0. Finally, non-increasingness of q(θ) implies that q (θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ,θ), q (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) and since t(.) is not differentiable atθ, 
free,θ and U m (θ) given, and 4. q 1 (θ) ≡ q(θ).
3.θ and U m (θ) given, and 4. q 2 (θ) ≡ q(θ).
[P * 1 ] and [P * 2 ] are two optimal control problems. In both these sub-problems q(.) is the control variable and U m (.) is the state variable. Finally,θ is the optimal cut-off point that links the two problems.
The Hamiltonian function associated with
for i = 1, 2. Here λ i (θ) is the co-state (or auxiliary) variable associated with the Hamiltonian H i (θ) for the type θ. The Lagrangian associated with the sub-problem
where µ(θ) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the type θ. The necessary conditions for
optimal constrained mechanism for the case when the available fundT is above some critical level T which allows for partial bunching and partial separation. The solution to this program will provide the exact amount of this critical level T.
[P *
where Ψ (θ) = θ θ µ(τ )dτ and k 1 is the constant of integration. 4 Since Ψ (θ) = F (θ) = 0 and since λ 1 (θ) = 0 from [P * 1 (4)], we get k 1 = 0. Therefore, from (5.2) we get
where k 2 is the constant of integration. Sinceθ is the optimal cut-off point for the program [P * ], we get λ 1 (θ) = λ 2 (θ). Then from conditions (5.3) and (5.4) we get k 2 = Ψ (θ) and hence
and then simplifying it, using q(θ) = q(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ,θ), we get
Similarly, substituting (5.5) in [P * 2 (1)] and then simplifying it we get for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] 
If µ(θ) > 0, then the right hand side of condition (5.8) is positive. This means that S (q 1 (θ)) > S (q 2 (θ)) and hence by strict concavity of S(.) we get q 1 (θ)) < q 2 (θ). This violates condition (5.1). Therefore, it must be the case that µ(θ) = 0 and hence q 1 (θ)) = q 2 (θ). Therefore, the constrained optimal mechanism M * for the partial bunching case satisfies the following three conditions:
for all θ ∈ [θ,θ), µ(θ) = 0,
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] and
Here (p1) follows from condition (5.6), (p2) follows from condition (5.7) and (p3) is obtained from [P * 1 (6)] which gives us the optimal cut-off pointθ. We now determine Ψ (θ). Integrating condition (5.6) after substituting ). Substituting θ =θ and c(θ) in condition (5.10) we get
). Observe that from the first part of Assumption 1 it follows that Ψ (θ) is well defined. Moreover, since Ψ (θ) = θ θ µ(τ )dτ and the Lagrangian multiplier µ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ [θ,θ), it is necessary that Ψ (θ) ≥ 0. Observe that Ψ (θ) = 0. Therefore, to show that Ψ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) it is now more than enough to show that Ψ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). By differentiating Ψ (θ) with respect to θ ∈ (θ, θ) and then setting it to be non-negative we get θ(1 + L (θ)) ≥ 2L(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) which is the second part of assumption 1. Hence, Ψ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) which means that Ψ (θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ). This implies that Ψ (θ) = (
θf (θ)−F (θ) ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) since our assumption that f (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] implies that F (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) and since for Ψ (θ) to be non-negative it is always necessary that θf (θ) − F (θ) > 0. Thus, conditions (p1), (p2) and (p3) together with Ψ (θ) = (
) > 0 gives us the conditions in Theorem 3.1 when partial bunching is optimal.
We will show that given Ψ (θ) = (
